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The dossier “Mental Time Travel and Moral Agency” was designed to show how philosoph-
ical investigation of episodic memory can help to clarify some basic functional presuppositions 
for moral agency. This  ecific relationship, strictly  eaking, is not new at all. For example, if we 
consider Locke’s classical discussion of personal identity, e ecially focusing on the peculiar set 
of questions that motivated it, we will realize that the operations of memory were already there. 
According to the famous chapter XXVII from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to be 
a person, in a forensic sense, namely, from the point of view of moral agency, is to be able to con-
nect the episodes of a lifetime in an autobiographical fashion. Indeed, we are all on the same page 
to recognize that piece of Locke’s writings as fons et origo for the philosophical problems around 
personal identity and, of course, moral personhood. 
Very few areas of contemporary philosophy presuppose an interdisciplinary work so thorny 
and toilsome as the philosophy of memory, and the impact of the idea of ‘mental time travel’ on 
the renewal of the body of acceptable questions and answers in the field, setting up new challeng-
es for researchers from the cognitive sciences, experimental psychology and, of course, philoso-
phy, gives us an eloquent testimony of the actual difficulties. The contributions for the dossier 
attest the interdisciplinary mood in that ongoing investigation, its very different per ectives, and 
some of the conceptual doubts and critical views on the use of the concept of mental time travel 
in the discussions on the functional architecture of episodic memory.     
Preliminary versions of the papers that make up this dossier were presented and discussed 
at the workshop “Mental Time Travel and Moral Agency” hosted by Unisinos University on Oc-
tober 16 and 17, 2017. The organization of the workshop and the present dossier were a source of 
great joy and intellectual satisfa ion, largely because of the opportunity to bring together young 
researchers who were working at that time in five different universities, from Brazil, Italy, and 
New Zealand.  
In Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory, André Sant’Anna offers a well-crafted 
resumé of what he calls ‘mental time travel view’ of memory, examining first the introduction of 
that concept in the empirical research on episodic memory and then in the raising of new propos-
als for solutions to older questions in that  ecific subfield. When we conceive episodic memory 
as part of a larger projective mechanism, in other words, as a mechanism whose main task is “to 
construct and imagine possible futures” (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p. 302) rather than re-
member the past, we already have the conceptual and explanatory link to moral agency or to the 
capacities for temporally project ourselves. That connection shows up clearly if we recollect the 
definition sugge ed by Gerrans and Kennett (2010, p. 588): “A moral agent needs to be able to 
conceive of herself as a temporally extended entity as a necessary condition for moral reflection 
and decision-making”. Indeed, the moral agent needs the capacity to frame temporally extended 
self-representations in both directions, past, and future, in order to have the resources to solve the 
moral evaluation problems ahead. 
Nara Figueiredo’s contribution, On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as 
awareness of pa  events, discusses, from a Wittgensteinian per ective, a major controversial 
The philosophy of episodic 
memory and moral agency
The philosophy of episodic memory and moral agency 
51Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 19(1):50-51, jan/apr 2018
topic in the philosophical investigation of memory, e e-
cially triggered after the distinction made by Endel Tulving 
between episodic and semantic memory. The controversy 
spread around different ways to explain or conceive the 
awareness of past and future events implied in Tulving’s 
view on episodic memory. The central suggestion of the pa-
per leads to reject the idea of episodic memory as awareness 
of past events and redesign the distinction between episod-
ic and semantic memory using the embodied capacities of 
recollecting events in a non-representationalist approach/
fashion to explain the first pair. As a desirable side effect, 
Figueiredo’s paper reminds us of the indi ensable task of 
conceptual clarification in order to improve psychological 
theories on memory processes. 
In a more empirically-informed per ective, César 
Meurer’s contribution, Mental time travel: towards a compu-
tational account, highlights some intersections between the 
philosophy of memory and metaphysical theories of time, on 
the one hand, and massive modularity approach in the phi-
losophy of mind and evolutionary psychology, on the other. 
The author suggests, on innovative grounds, that both the 
abilities of mental time travel and process present events, im-
plement similar computational cognitive tasks and, most im-
portantly, both capacities seem to be functionally dependent 
on the I-HERE-NOW module as a basic self-representation. 
If Meurer it is on the right track on that hypothesis, then we 
must accept that mental time travel and moral agency are 
both functionally dependent on the self-referential tracking 
of what he calls the “ecological now”. 
 Situating “mental time travel” in the broad context of tem-
poral cognition: A neural systems approach, authored by Fernan-
da M. Carvalho, magnifies the body of empirically relevant 
information needed for a better understanding of the abili-
ties for mental time travelling in the broadest context of the 
cognitive apparatus that enables us to experience the flow 
of subjective time and to process the temporal dynamic of 
real events. The section ‘Neural correlates of mental time trav-
el (MTT) and self-referential cognition’ is e ecially relevant to 
grasp the connections between moral agency and mental time 
travel abilities because it reviews and discusses the empirical 
evidence for the overlapping of brain regions a ivated in 
counterfactual thinking, remembering the past and project-
ing the future, which are three of the most salient capacities 
required for moral agency.     
 In Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Con-
siderations about guidance control, Beatriz Sorrentino Marques 
prudently steps back a little to examine whether a  ecial type 
of mental time travel, which she calls, following the relevant 
literature, implicit pro ection, is a requirement for attribu-
tions of moral responsibility for one’s a ions. Her strategy is 
prudent because she is not talking about all kinds of mental 
time travelling related to general capacities for moral agency 
but focusing on a central a ect and well-delimited sine qua 
non ability for moral agency: self-attributions of moral re-
sponsibility. The paper concludes in an exemplary way that 
implicit pro ection helps to explain one of the main com-
ponents for planning, form intentions, and guidance control, 
namely, the affective valence in the act of choosing one course 
of a ion instead of another.       
 Undoing one’s pa , the last paper of the dossier, by Edu-
ardo Vicentini de Medeiros, argues for a single point, asking 
us to consider the episodic counterfactual thinking as a pos-
sible direction in mental time travel simulations, in order to 
obtain a more robust picture of capable moral agency. The 
main idea is to propose a cluster of mental operations for 
moral agency, including (a) episodic memory, (b) episodic 
future thinking, (c) the capacity for regret, and (d) episodic 
counterfactual thinking. 
On behalf of all participants, we hope the present dossier 
will arouse the interest of the prestigious community of Filo-
sofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy’s readers, encour-
aging a fruitful debate on the proposed topic. 
Eduardo Vicentini de Medeiros
Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul
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